 The broad goals 
  of nanotechnology—the 
  ability to inexpensively arrange atoms in most of the ways permitted by 
  physical law—are now widely accepted, but we need more. It is not enough to 
  agree that heavier than air flight is possible, nor is it sufficient to 
  believe that some design based on rockets can reach the moon, nor does the 
  abstract realization that mass can be converted to energy change the course of 
  history. We need to move to the next step: the Wright Brothers, the Apollo 
  Program, the Manhattan Project—we need to translate abstract agreement into a 
  focused and funded project.
The broad goals 
  of nanotechnology—the 
  ability to inexpensively arrange atoms in most of the ways permitted by 
  physical law—are now widely accepted, but we need more. It is not enough to 
  agree that heavier than air flight is possible, nor is it sufficient to 
  believe that some design based on rockets can reach the moon, nor does the 
  abstract realization that mass can be converted to energy change the course of 
  history. We need to move to the next step: the Wright Brothers, the Apollo 
  Program, the Manhattan Project—we need to translate abstract agreement into a 
  focused and funded project.
  This raises the 
  obvious question: focused on what?
  
  
  Nanosystems gave us a persuasive feasibility argument for
  assemblers, 
  but didn't give us a design for a specific assembler. For every fundamental 
  design problem, Nanosystems gave us several feasible solutions—but 
  never picked one specific solution. Indeed, one of the main thrusts was that 
  we could have confidence that assemblers were feasible precisely because there 
  were many solutions to every problem—it's difficult to be absolutely certain 
  that a specific solution will work, but when there are many possible solutions 
  available it's almost certain one of them will work.
  We have seen 
  continued work on specific aspects of assembler design but we haven't seen a 
  complete design. Such a design (and accompanying analysis) is feasible today, 
  but a complete design will require the work of a team of people for some 
  years. We need to explore the space of possible designs, analyze at least some 
  designs in full detail, and then use those designs as a point of focus for 
  further development. We can start today, but have not.
  The major 
  consequence of this failure is continued delay, much of which will be caused 
  by continued confusion about "what is an assembler." While we know that all 
  the fundamental problems can be solved, we don't have a single design or 
  embodiment that selects a specific solution for each problem and integrates 
  those specific solutions into a single unified system. Perhaps more seriously, 
  there is the fog and uncertainty created by mental confusion and 
  misunderstanding. People have a hard time grasping complex arguments and 
  abstract conclusions, and when we are hearing new ideas for the first time 
  it's very easy to get confused. Flight to the moon was thought impossible 
  because "there is no air to push against" in the vacuum of space. Airplane 
  wings push against air, propellers push against air, helicopter blades push 
  against air—surely the proposed space rockets were meant to push against air? 
  But there is no air in space! So can our experience with familiar things 
  mislead us when we consider fundamentally new ideas.
  A project with 
  many people must have a clear, detailed, and comprehensive description of both 
  the goal and how to achieve it. We need at least one design for an assembler 
  with all the kinks worked out, all the irritating little design issues 
  settled, all the potential sticking points resolved. Without this, any effort 
  to build an assembler will deteriorate into chaos and confusion as the people 
  involved find themselves working at cross purposes—possibly without even 
  realizing it. If we want to build a heavier-than-air flying machine, and one 
  person designs the blades for a helicopter and another works out the wings of 
  an airplane while a third says we should propel the device by throwing sticks 
  of dynamite out the rear and exploding them, the result will be chaos.
  Right now, the 
  detail that we can achieve in a system design is limited by the fact that 
  serious design efforts have so far been limited to one or perhaps two people. 
  We could greatly increase the detail of the design by increasing the number of 
  people (provided they are the right people). Half a dozen to a dozen people, 
  properly coordinated, would be a great improvement over the present situation, 
  and would start to provide us with system designs that had a level of detail 
  that would give us greater collective clarity in understanding the goal and a 
  greater ability to determine the developmental pathways for reaching it.
  Besides pursuing 
  designs in greater depth and detail, we should also examine designs that 
  differ radically in their approach and assumptions—we can explore the design 
  space seeking designs that are (for example) easier to build. Consider the 
  Analytical Engine, designed by Babbage in the 1830's. The single most 
  important intellectual development of the 20th century, Babbage's design was 
  never built nor was there any systematic exploration of possible alternatives.
  
  Looking back 
  with the advantage of 20-20 hindsight, we can see what Babbage and the rest of 
  the world missed: relays. Relays were known in the 1830's, and were widely 
  deployed in the 1840's for use in telegraphy. Had Babbage and others explored 
  the design space for "Analytical Engines," they might have realized that a 
  relay-based computer was relatively easy to build and quite practical. But 
  they didn't, and so missed an opportunity of historic magnitude.
  Let's not miss 
  another opportunity.