Thirty Essential Nanotechnology Studies - #28
Overview of all studies: Because of the largely
unexpected transformational power of molecular manufacturing, it is urgent to
understand the issues raised. To date, there has not been anything approaching
an adequate study of these issues. CRN's recommended series of
thirty essential studies
is organized into five sections, covering fundamental theory, possible
technological capabilities, bootstrapping potential, product capabilities, and
policy questions. Several preliminary conclusions are stated, and because our
understanding points to a crisis, a parallel process of conducting the studies
is urged.
CRN is actively looking for researchers interested in
performing or assisting with this work. Please contact CRN Research Director
Chris Phoenix if you would like more information or if you have comments on
the proposed studies.
| Study #28 |
What
policies toward development of molecular manufacturing does all this
suggest? |
| |
There are several
policy options for the development of molecular manufacturing (MM). Which
ones might work as planned, and what would be their effects on
post-development courses of action? |
| Subquestion |
Relinquishment:
prevent development worldwide? |
| Preliminary answer |
This is highly
unlikely to work. It'll be too easy to develop, and the basic theory has
been published for more than a decade. |
|
The effect of
attempted relinquishment would be to ensure that MM was developed by random
outlaws. The delay would allow time for the development of more enabling
technologies, probably increasing the abruptness of development and
deployment. |
|
Subquestion |
Asymmetric
development: one nation develops in advance of the others? |
| Preliminary answer |
This appears
possible, depending on which nation. If a nation other than the U.S. tries
it and does not conceal their effort successfully, the U.S. will likely be
able to catch up, leading to parallel development or possibly to U.S.-led
asymmetric development. A U.S. program would have to be well designed,
avoiding a variety of problems common to U.S. government-funded programs. |
| |
The likely
follow-up to asymmetric development would be an attempt at worldwide
control. The effects of this would depend heavily on the policies adopted by
the government in question. |
| Subquestion |
Parallel
development: several nations develop at around the same time? |
| Preliminary answer |
This seems quite
likely, either from an arms race or from development by multinational
corporations. |
|
The result would
depend heavily on policy. If an arms race can be avoided, and effective
administration/policing can be implemented, it could turn out well. But an
arms race looks pretty likely, and would probably be disastrous. Also,
parallel development would make it harder to restrict proliferation. |
| Subquestion |
International
development: explicit cooperation between nations? |
| Preliminary answer |
Seems unlikely to
be tried. If it is tried, it's likely to fail due to politics, mistrust, and
inefficiency that allows a national crash/secret program to finish first. |
|
International
development would reduce the pressure for an arms race and give multiple
nations a stake in setting the policy for use of MM. Paradoxically, it could
reduce proliferation, since joint ownership would encourage the widespread
availability of controlled versions and blunt the desire for uncontrolled
versions. |
|
Corporate
development by a large, international corporation may also be an interesting
possibility to study. It may even be worth trying to make it happen that
way. Corporate development is likely to be a lot more efficient and less
vulnerable to politics than a project that's shared between governments. But
it would still promote the benefits listed in the previous paragraph,
assuming the corporation has (and follows!) really good policy advice. |
| Subquestion |
Non-proliferation: restrict availability of the core technology? |
| Preliminary answer |
Will probably be
tried. Will probably help to some extent. Will be ineffective in the long
run unless combined with two other policies: 1) reduce desire for
unrestricted technology by providing easy access to restricted but useful
technology; 2) develop the ability to deal with eventual proliferation. |
| |
The
alternative—allowing everyone access to the unrestricted technology—appears
extremely dangerous; perhaps comparable to leaving the post-Soviet nuclear
infrastructure unguarded. |
| Subquestion |
Slow development:
don't make special efforts? |
| Preliminary answer |
Likely to lead to
random development, rapid bootstrapping due to other nanotech advances, and
lack of ability to implement policy. |
|
If development is
delayed long enough for other technologies to catch up (perhaps two or three
decades) then this could give us time to adjust gradually. But that much
delay appears unlikely, and we'd lose the benefits for those decades (see
study #30). |
| Subquestion |
Accelerated
development: put limited effort toward it? |
| Preliminary answer |
Would likely
inspire other efforts, leading to parallel development. |
| Subquestion |
Crash
development: put maximum effort toward it? |
| Preliminary answer |
Could lead to
either parallel or asymmetric development. Could smooth the transition by
requiring more creativity to design products. |
| Conclusion |
Early development combined with anti-proliferation policy appears
preferable, but more study is needed, and the outcome depends heavily on the
actions of the developer(s).
|
| Other studies |
1.
Is
mechanically guided chemistry a viable basis for a manufacturing technology?
2. To what extent is molecular manufacturing counterintuitive and
underappreciated in a way that causes underestimation of its importance?
3. What is
the performance and potential of diamondoid machine-phase chemical
manufacturing and products?
4. What is the performance and potential of biological programmable
manufacturing and products?
5. What is the performance and potential of nucleic acid
manufacturing and products?
6. What other chemistries and options should be studied?
7. What
applicable sensing, manipulation, and fabrication tools exist?
8. What will be required to develop diamondoid machine-phase chemical
manufacturing and products?
9. What will be required to develop biological programmable
manufacturing and products?
10. What will be required to develop nucleic acid manufacturing and
products?
11. How rapidly will the cost of development decrease?
12. How could an effective development program be structured?
13. What is
the probable capability of the manufacturing system?
14. How capable will the products be?
15. What will the products cost?
16. How rapidly could products be designed?
17. Which
of today's products will the system make more accessible or cheaper?
18. What new products will the system make accessible?
19. What impact will the system have on production and distribution?
20. What effect will molecular manufacturing have on military and
government capability and planning, considering the implications of arms
races and unbalanced development?
21. What effect will this have on macro- and microeconomics?
22. How can proliferation and use of nanofactories and their products
be limited?
23. What effect will this have on policing?
24. What beneficial or desirable effects could this have?
25. What effect could this have on civil rights and liberties?
26. What are the disaster/disruption scenarios?
27. What effect could this have on geopolitics?
29. What policies toward administration of molecular manufacturing
does all this suggest?
30. How can appropriate policy be made and implemented?
|
| Studies should begin
immediately. |
The situation is
extremely urgent. The stakes are unprecedented, and the world is unprepared.
The basic findings of these studies should be verified as rapidly as
possible (months, not years). Policy preparation and planning for
implementation, likely including a crash development program, should begin
immediately. |
